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Abstract 
Risk assessment is used in many industries to identify and manage 
risks. Initially developed for use on aeronautical and nuclear systems, 
risk assessment has been applied to transportation, chemical, 
computer, financial, and security systems among others. It is used to 
gain an understanding of the weaknesses or vulnerabilities in a 
system so modification can be made to increase operability, 
efficiency, and safety and to reduce failure and down-time. Risk 
assessment results are primary inputs to risk-informed decision 
making; where risk information including uncertainty is used along 
with other pertinent information to assist management in the 
decision-making process.  Therefore, to be useful, a risk assessment 
must be directed at specific objectives.  
 
As the world embraces the globalization of trade and manufacturing, 
understanding the associated risk become important to decision 
making. Applying risk assessment techniques to a global system of 
development, manufacturing, and transportation can provide insight 
into how the system can fail, the likelihood of system failure and the 
consequences of system failure. The risk assessment can identify 
those elements that contribute most to risk and identify measures to 
prevent and mitigate failures, disruptions, and damaging outcomes. In 
addition, risk associated with public and environment impact can be 
identified. The risk insights gained can be applied to making 
decisions concerning suitable development and manufacturing 
locations, supply chains, and transportation strategies. While risk 
assessment has been mostly applied to mechanical and electrical 
systems, the concepts and techniques can be applied across other 
systems and activities. This paper provides a basic overview of the 
development of a risk assessment. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The conduct of a risk assessment requires integrated and 
comprehensive analysis and modeling. The analysis is 
conducted in the context of a system’s operation and 
environment, and accounts for the presence of hazards. The 
model includes all systems, subsystems, events, failures, and 
conditions that can have a significant impact on the results. 
The risk analyst studies the system’s configuration; its 
operation, its past performance and history, and its interaction 
with other systems and collects data to develop an analytical 
model reflecting the state of the system being analyzed. For 
some assessments, the model and analysis must account for 
changes in the system’s state (phased mission analysis) as a 
mission progresses or for processes that change from start-up 
to steady state operation. This paper will discuss the steps in 
the risk assessment process, risk definition, modeling, events, 
uncertainty, and application to risk-informed decision making. 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
Risk assessment is defined as a systematic methodology for 
analyzing a system, a process, or an activity to answer three 
basic questions: 
 
• What can go wrong that would lead to loss or degraded 
performance (i.e., scenarios involving undesired 
consequences of interest)?  
 
• How likely is it (probability of scenarios)?  
 
• What is the severity of the degradation (consequences)? 
 
The conduct of a risk assessment is the process of generating 
the risk triplet set, as shown in Table 1 [1]: 
 
R ≡ RISK ≡ {‹ Si, pi, Ci ›} 
 
where:  
 
Si is the ith scenario; 
 pi is the probability (or likelihood) of the ith scenario; and 
Ci is the consequences associated with the ith scenario. 
 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is the formal 
methodology used to derive and quantify the risk triplet for the 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20110016003 2019-08-30T17:27:55+00:00Z
 derived scenarios of the system, process, or activity being 
analyzed in an integrated manner. PRA provides a framework 
to prioritize risks, identify risk contributors, and quantify 
cumulative (aggregate) risk and associated uncertainties. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Scenarios, Probabilities, and Consequences 
 
A SYSTEMS VIEW 
 
A system is a combination of elements that function to 
produce the capability required for a desired outcome. The 
elements include hardware, software, equipment, personnel, 
facilities, processes, procedures, and resources which can 
collectively be called assets. All assets are subject to various 
threats dependent on the system configuration, contained 
hazards, and operating environment. Threats are the initiating 
events in a risk assessment and include internal hardware and 
software failures, external environmental or physical events 
(such are earthquakes, wildfire), unintentional human error, or 
intentional events (such as terrorist acts).  Systems are 
designed with controls to prevent threats from impacting 
assets. However, not all threats will be prevented from 
reaching the asset. When that occurs, the asset will respond to 
the impact. This response is dependent on the system 
configuration, the nature of the threat, and the failure 
mechanism of the preventative controls.  Realizing that 
affected assets can cause harm, systems are designed with 
controls to mitigate undesired outcomes. These controls 
eliminate or reduce consequences that can occur from the 
response of the asset to a particular threat and preventative 
control failure. Consequences can be injury, fatality, loss of 
property, monetary loss, etc. and are dependent on the makeup 
of the system.  A systems look at risk assessment is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A systems look at risk assessment 
 
In a risk assessment, each of these elements is evaluated in a 
comprehensive and integrated manner. In a PRA, the 
probabilities of each element are determined along with their 
uncertainties to assess the overall probabilities of identified 
consequence.  
 
STEPS IN THE PRA METHODOLOGY 
 
A scenario-based risk assessment involves the following steps: 
 
• Definition of objective 
• System familiarization 
• Identification of initiating events 
• Scenario modeling 
• Failure modeling 
• Quantification 
• Uncertainty analysis 
• Sensitivity analysis 
• Importance ranking 
• Data analysis 
 
Definition of Objectives 
 
The objective of the risk assessment must be well defined and 
directed toward its intended use, particularly to be used for 
risk-informed decision making. The objective should include 
the identification and selection of the undesired consequences 
of interest (end states): harm to humans (e.g., injury, illness, or 
death), degradation of functional capabilities, loss of 
operability, property losses, or other consequences.  
Depending on the scope of the PRA, applicable system 
configuration, and time frame; rules for considering initiators 
(i.e., whether to include external events) should be defined. 
Rules for both scope and detail should be developed and 
reviewed by the intended users of the PRA results. 
 
 System Familiarization 
 
Familiarization with the system under analysis includes all 
relevant design and operational information, engineering and 
process drawings, as well as operating and emergency 
procedures. If the PRA is performed on an existing system that 
has been operated for some time, the engineering information 
should be on an as-built or as-operated basis rather than on an 
as-designed system. Visual inspection of the system being 
analyzed is recommended.  The purpose of this effort is to 
become thoroughly familiar with the system and its operation, 
and to gain an understanding of the success states needed for 
proper function and operation. 
 
Identification of Threats or Initiating Events 
 
A complete set of threats or initiating events (events that 
trigger subsequent scenarios) should be identified and 
analyzed. These events initiate scenarios leading to defined 
end states. Events in a set of scenarios leading to the same end 
state but having very low probabilities can be screened out.  
The identification of the initiating events can be accomplished 
with special types of top-level logic trees called master logic 
diagrams (MLD).  Additional techniques, like Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA), can also be used to identify 
initiators.  Independent initiating events can be grouped 
according to the similarity of challenges that they pose to the 
system (system responses that result from their occurrence).  
When initiating events are treated as a group, their frequencies 
should be summed to derive the group initiator frequency. 
 
Scenario Modeling 
 
A scenario is a sequence of events starting with the threat (or 
initiating event) progressing through pivotal event(s) leading 
to the undesired end states as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: An accident scenario 
 
The modeling of scenarios is an inductive process that usually 
involves tools called event trees. An example of a simple 
event tree is shown in Figure 3. An event tree starts with the 
initiating event and progresses through the scenario, a series of 
successes or failures of intermediate events (also called pivotal 
events or top events), until end-states are reached.  Sometimes, 
a graphical tool called an event sequence diagram (ESD) is 
used to describe an accident scenario, because this type of 
diagram better suits engineering thinking than does an event 
tree.  An ESD is shown in Figure 4.  An ESD is logically 
equivalent to an event tree. Other types of inductive modeling 
tools can also be employed.   
 
 
 
Note: LOM = loss of mission, loss of function: LOC = loss of crew, loss of personnel 
 
Figure 3: A simple event tree 
 
 
 
Figure 4: An event sequence diagram 
 
 
Failure Modeling 
 
The modeling of the failure (or its complement, success) of 
each pivotal event or event tree top event is a deductive 
process that usually involves tools called fault trees. A fault 
tree consists of three parts. The top part is the top event, which 
corresponds to the failure of a pivotal event in the accident 
scenario.  The middle part consists of intermediate events 
(faults) that can cause failure of the top event.  These events 
are linked through logic gates (e.g., AND gates and OR gates) 
to the bottom part of the fault tree. The events at the bottom of 
the fault tree are called basic events, whose failure ultimately 
led to the occurrence of the top event. A fault tree is shown in 
Figure 5. The fault trees are then linked to the accident 
scenarios and simplified (using Boolean reduction rules) to 
support quantification. Other deductive modeling tools can 
also be employed to evaluate the failure of top events. 
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Figure 5: A fault tree 
 
 
Quantification 
 
Quantification refers to the process of estimating the 
frequency and the consequences of the undesired end states.  
The frequency of occurrence of each end state is calculated 
using a fault tree linking approach resulting in the logical 
product of the initiating event frequency and the (conditional) 
probabilities of each pivotal event along the scenario path 
from the initiating event to the end-state.  The fault trees for 
each pivotal event are linked to the event tree to quantify the 
pivotal events in terms of the basic events. A diagram for 
event tree and fault linking is shown in Figure 6. All like end 
states are then grouped; i.e., their probabilities are logically 
summed into the probability of the representative end-state 
 
Uncertainty Analysis 
 
Uncertainty is a term used to describe an imperfect state of 
knowledge or a variability resulting from a variety of factors 
including, but not limited to, lack of knowledge, applicability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Event tree and fault linking 
 
 
of information, physical variation, randomness or stochastic 
behavior, indeterminacy, judgment, and approximation.  
 
There are two types of uncertainty: 
 
• Aleatory uncertainty associated with variation or 
stochastic behavior in physical properties or physical 
characteristics of the systems addressed. 
   
This term pertains to stochastic events, the outcome of 
which is described by a probability.  It is derived from the 
Latin “alea” (game of chance, die).  
 
• Epistemic uncertainty associated with lack of 
completeness in the analysts’ state of knowledge – 
reducible in principle given additional information. 
 
This term pertains to the degree of knowledge of events.  
It is derived from the Greek “episteme” (knowledge). 
 
A PRA attempts to model uncertain events, and the risk model 
is effectively an uncertainty analysis model. Recognition of 
uncertainty analysis as the fabric of the PRA model is 
paramount to proper application of PRA results in the RM 
decision-making process.  It is incumbent on the PRA analyst 
to find ways to quantify and present the uncertainty associated 
with risk results in a manner that is understandable to decision 
makers.  Any PRA insights reported to decision makers should 
include an appreciation of the overall degree of uncertainty 
about the results and an understanding of which sources of 
uncertainty are critical to the results.  Monte Carlo simulation 
methods are generally used to perform uncertainty analysis.   
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
One type of uncertainty analysis is sensitivity analysis that 
focuses on modeling uncertainties in assumptions, modeling 
and basic events.  These analyses are frequently performed in 
a PRA to indicate those analysis inputs or elements whose 
value changes cause the greatest changes in partial or final risk 
results. 
 
Ranking 
 
In some PRA applications, special techniques are used to 
identify the lead, or dominant, contributors to risk in accident 
sequences or scenarios.  The ranking of these lead or dominant 
contributors in decreasing order of importance is called 
importance ranking.  This process is usually performed using 
the fault trees and the event trees. 
 
Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis refers to the process of collecting and analyzing 
information in order to estimate various parameters of the 
PRA models.  These parameters are used to obtain 
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 probabilities of the various events including component failure 
rates, initiator frequencies, and human failure probabilities.  
An example of an event probability distribution is shown in 
Figure 7.  Developing a PRA database of parameter estimates 
involves: (1) identification of the data needed; (2) data 
collection; and (3) parameter estimation using statistical 
methods to develop uncertainty distribution for the model 
parameters.  In cases where there are no statistically 
significant data to support PRA parameter estimation, the PRA 
analyst may need to rely on expert judgment.  The data 
analysis task proceeds in parallel or in conjunction with the 
steps described above.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Example of event probability distribution 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT IN RISK-INFORMED DECISION 
MAKING 
 
Traditional decision making uses mostly “deterministic” 
safety modeling techniques. Probabilities are not quantified 
and uncertainties are managed using margins. 
 
In a risk informed approach, decision alternatives are 
evaluated using both traditional safety methods and 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approaches.  The 
quantitative and qualitative results of the risk assessment 
(including scenario probabilities, consequences, and 
uncertainties) are used to inform the decisions. The risk-
informed decision-making process is depicted in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Risk-informed decision making 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Risk assessment is powerful methodology when used to gain 
insight on the weaknesses or vulnerabilities in system 
processes and operations.  
 
A risk assessment: 
 
• is a comprehensive and systematic decision analysis tool; 
• is integrated and multidisciplinary; 
• provides insight into how a system fails; 
• provides insights into how various systems interact with 
one another; 
• quantifies uncertainties and identifies what the system 
safety analysts knows or does not know; 
• provides a structure for trade studies; 
• identifies the dominant accident scenarios, so that risk 
management decisions are targeted toward risk significant 
hazards; and 
• quantifies the risk significance of contributing elements. 
 
Risk assessment is a powerful tool when used to assist 
decision making.  When applied to the globalization of trade 
and manufacturing, risk assessment can lead to system 
adjustments and changes to increase operability, efficiency, 
and safety and to reduce failures and down-time. 
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